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Introduction 
Generalized solutions with apparently limitless applications are anathema to 
Isabelle Stengers, who demands that we recognize the specificity of the remit of the 
abstractions that we are constructing. One hallmark of her work is the distrust of any 
response which appears to be able to mollify a wide range of positions, problems or 
questions. Stengers is also wary of denouncing the positions held by opponents by 
claiming to trap them in a logical vice or pinning them in an absurdity. This is why, in 
this article, I do not set out to solve either the problem of cause or the problem of 
faith. Instead, I want to eavesdrop on the ongoing conversation between Stengers 
and Whitehead and to provide some comments on how their remarks could help us 
reorient how we approach some of the unexpected interrelations between faith and 
cause in science, philosophy, and social science. Stengers’ stance does not imply 
that we should not be ambitious in the questions or problems that we address; 
though there is a need to pay attention to that which has been isolated as being of 
concern. In the discussions that follow, I will ask some apparently general questions, 
but these are motivated by a central problem, namely, that the very status of cause 
and causation. 
 When we take a strict theoretical approach to science, or adopt a purely 
philosophical position, we might find it easy to say that there is no such thing as 
cause in the abstract. There is no hidden ultimate cause which sits behind the world, 
governing, regulating and explaining every single moment, item and process of 
existence. Yet, we also believe that smoking causes cancer; we tell children that 
matches can cause fires; we inform our insurance company that it was the other car 
which caused the accident.  However, such mentions of causation lack the strength 
of a full concept of cause. It is not that smoking inevitably and always leads to 
cancer; or that all matches are determined to produce fires; or that the other driver 
was compelled to crash into us. The effect is not present in the cause: the same 
cause does not always produce the same effect. This leaves us in the tricky position 
where we may dismiss cause on theoretical grounds, but we find it harder to do 
without some notion of causation in our everyday lives.  
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 It is this problematic status of causation, as something which we may deny in 
some aspects of our lives and yet require in others, that I want to address in this 
article. For reasons which I hope will become clear, I will also link this to the notion of 
faith in science and in social science. I will use Stengers’ ideas to argue that we 
need some clarity with regard to the distinctions between cause as an abstract 
concept, individual causes, and the very notion of causation. Too often these are 
mixed, the boundaries blurred, and this can lead to unnecessary confusion and a 
premature rejection of “cause” as a genuine factor in the world and our experience of 
it. This lack of clarity certainly constitutes a problem for many a sociologist who have 
all been carefully schooled to talk only of correlations and to avoid, like the plague, 
any mention of direct causes; so that they unthinkingly cite the modern sociologist’s 
mantra –“Correlation is not causation”– a mantra which only makes sense if the very 
concept of cause is seen as problematic, as something to be shunned. 
 In the analyses which follow, there are three elements that I want to draw out, 
in place of a solution. These are, first - the particular, and slightly peculiar, stance of 
modern science with regard to cause. Second, the idea that the problem of the 
problem of cause is one that we have inherited in a very specific way.  A recognition 
of this legacy could allow for us to rethink the scope of this problem. Third, a 
reconsideration of the role of faith in both science and social science. Perhaps social 
science has lost faith in cause, when there was no need. What social science does 
require is a reappraisal of its faith in itself and in the world.  
 
Whitehead and Stengers on “the birth of modern science” 
 
Both Stengers and Whitehead maintain that if we are to understand 
contemporary science we must understand its origin. The aim is not to indulge in a 
simple history of ideas but to “dramatize” the problem (Stengers, Speculative; see 
also Cosmopolitics 182-88) to see what was at stake in the arguments which 
surrounded its genesis. For Whitehead, the story of modern science starts as a 
revolt against the overly rationalist conditions of medieval thought. ‘Science was 
through and through an anti-intellectualist movement. It was the return to the 
contemplation of brute fact; and it was based on a recoil from the inflexible rationality 
of medieval thought’ (Whitehead, Science 10). This inflexible rationality, in turn, has 
its own specific characteristics. Importantly, they are to do with metaphysics. ‘By this 
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rationalism I mean the belief that the avenue to truth was predominantly through a 
metaphysical analysis of the nature of things, which would thereby determine how 
things acted and functioned’ (Whitehead, Science 49). It is against this metaphysical 
inflexibility that Whitehead sets the rise of modern science.  
 Whitehead does not, however, dismiss all that the medieval era has to offer. 
To do so would be to reinforce the mistaken idea that modern science represents the 
dawn of a completely new era. It heralds a break from a past mired in religion and 
superstition, and can be seen, retrospectively, as both the origin and the apotheosis 
of the Enlightenment’s claims to be an ahistorical, secular and universal mode of 
thought. In Whitehead’s version of the story, they key idea that modern science 
inherited from the medieval era was ‘the inexpungable belief that every detailed 
occurrence can be correlated with its antecedents in a perfectly definite manner, 
exemplifying general principles’ (Whitehead, Science 15). What medievalism and 
modern science share is the need for an attention to detail. Where they differ is with 
regard to the status of “general principles”. The medieval mind will try to fit details 
into an already existing logical or metaphysical scheme of “general principles” such 
as cause, effect, existence, individuation. However, these details are not self-
sufficient and so are not of interest for their own sake; they are located within a wider 
theological scheme. As such, these general principles are governed and guaranteed 
by a specific kind of God, one who inherits the rationality espoused by medieval 
readings of Greek philosophy. According to this outlook, an investigation of the 
details of the world will ultimately reveal the ‘rationality of God, conceived as with the 
personal energy of Jehovah and with the rationality of a Greek philosopher. Every 
detail was supervised and ordered: the search into nature could only result in the 
vindication of the faith in rationality’ (Whitehead, Science 15).  
Here lies the difference with modern science, and the motivation for the 
latter’s revolt. The medieval metaphysical survey of nature did not find anything 
more, it only vindicated what was already known. Modern science announces a new 
approach. It may well, like the medievals, use reason to search for general 
principles, but it does not want to rely upon a rational explanation which comes prior 
to the details of its investigations. The principles of science will be subordinate to the 
more basic and compelling idea – that an investigation of the details of the world ‘for 
their own sake’ will yield more (Whitehead, Science 16). As will be seen later, 
modern science’s commitment to the importance of details for their own sake and the 
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resulting “more”, constitutes a crucial element of the “faith” of science. For the 
moment, the main consequence of this outlook is that the metaphysical concept of 
cause as a guiding principle which is discoverable before or without recourse to the 
things of the world becomes alien to science, as it runs counter to, or hindered, the 
investigation of the details of what actually happens. By committing itself to a study 
of details which may provide more, science may indeed outline localized regularities 
where localized causes seem to operate.1 But these localized causes can neither be 
ascertained prior to an investigation of the details. This is why ‘Galileo keeps harping 
on how things happen, whereas his adversaries had a complete theory as to why 
things happen’ (Whitehead, Science 10). Whitehead does not say much more about 
the detail of Galileo’s harping, whereas Stengers has provided innovative analyses 
of his status in the development of modern science (for example, Invention and 
Cosmopolitics). The following discussion is offered not as a simple exemplification of 
Whitehead’s analysis but as a development of it, one which takes us in new 
directions. The most important, in terms of this article, are those of faith and cause.   
  Stengers would not want to dismiss the notion of cause out of hand, but she 
would ask us to be specific in terms of the problem that we are addressing. It may 
well turn out that it is possible to invoke efficient causation but this must involve a 
recognition of the specific situations in which it can be conceived, the demands that it 
places upon us, and the limits of its application. One clear example of this can be 
found in her reading of Galileo and his “discovery” of the laws of motion which 
govern falling bodies. Here, Stengers (Invention 77-9) makes the key point that 
Galileo’s argument does not “come out of nowhere”. As with Whitehead’s account, 
there is a need to understand that the specific milieu in which this problem is 
situated, namely, the kind of skepticism which was to be found in the late Middle 
Ages and which Galileo felt compelled to overcome. To understand Galileo, we need 
to understand this form of skepticism. Stengers characterizes it as follows: ‘the 
Middle Ages created a new figure of skepticism […] condemning as erroneous, from 
the viewpoint of faith, any use of reason that would limit God’s absolute freedom’ 
(Stengers, Invention 79). Again, as with Whitehead, there is a need to situate the 
reaction of “science” to the theological.  
                                                          
1
 Although, as Stengers points out, science has not always been faithful to its discovery of more. For, when 
science wants ‘to convince us that electromagnetic radiation constitutes the sole type of entity which belongs 
to nature…it has found “more” in nature, but it proposes to reduce it to “less”’ (Stengers, Penser 52). 
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Moreover, “faith” is not some abstract notion, it is particular. The medieval 
mind’s conception of faith was mired in a sense of God’s freedom beyond the limits 
of human thought, intellect or reason. Within Christian theology of the time, it was 
maintained that anything that an individual human might imagine, speculate or state 
could in no way limit the power or abilities of an omnipotent God. Galileo, or any 
other, may announce the idea that all bodies fall in a regular way, for example, but 
no individual human can claim that this surpasses God’s power. God could have 
willed it, or still could will it, that some bodies remain still or rise, or appear and 
disappear. ‘What appears absurd to us is perhaps not so for God’ (Stengers, 
Invention 77).  
Galileo recognized this difficulty and this is why, in 1638, he set out his 
discussion of falling bodies in the form of a discourse between three speakers. One 
of these speakers, Sagredo, is given the role of countering Galileo with the 
theological skepticism of the day. In this vein, Sagredo states: ‘I [Sagredo] may 
nevertheless without offense be allowed to doubt whether such a definition […] 
established in the abstract manner, corresponds to and describes that kind of 
accelerated motion which we meet in in nature in the case of freely falling bodies’ 
(cited in Stengers, Invention 76). Here, Sagredo is simply reiterating a prevalent 
position of the day, that the abstract definition offered by one human cannot claim, 
on its own, to surpass the power or will of God for things to be otherwise. This 
represents, in a slightly different manner, the challenge that Whitehead envisaged for 
modern science to counter definitions “established in the abstract manner”.  
Galileo needs to show that his principles are not merely abstract and therefore 
arbitrary. To accomplish this, he constructed an apparatus which involved an inclined 
plane on a flat table. This enabled him to elaborate the relations between the motion 
of a ball down an inclined plane, its horizontal motion across the table-top, its free-
fall from the table to the ground.  The key point is that Galileo “constructed” an 
apparatus which, once produced, enables “the motion to testify” on its own. There is 
no longer any need for Galileo. He can withdraw and let the motion speak for itself, 
and make its own argument. In an important sense, this procedure marks the birth of 
modern science and modern physics, but this birth also relies upon what Stengers’ 
calls the “power of fiction” (Stengers, Invention 79-80). It is only recognizing the 
“power of the fiction” of Sagredo’s objection, the power that such skepticism had at 
that time, that Galileo is able to circumvent it. Only through a direct recognition of this 
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fiction can a different kind of fabrication and fiction, a specifically “scientific fiction” 
(Galileo’s apparatus) be constructed, in order to contest the arbitrary, abstract fiction 
of skepticism or relativism. But what does all this have to do with cause and effect? 
Is this to suggest that cause and effects are merely “fictions”? 
 
Galileo’s apparatus is designed to focus on how bodies fall, how quickly balls roll 
down inclined planes, how they move across a table, how they fall to the floor. He 
does not ask “why” they do so, as this would return him to the metaphysical and 
theological problems that bewitch Sagredo and his ilk, especially in terms of a prior, 
abstract cause explaining “why” all bodies fell in predictable ways. ‘The scientific 
“how” thus has no other a priori limits than those of the questions that, rightly or 
wrongly, are recognized as scientific. The “why,” in this staging, has no autonomous 
formulation […] it must first learn from the “how” what it is authorized to ask’ 
(Stengers, Invention 82). Questions about “why” lead us to the metaphysical-
theological concept of cause which is to be sharply differentiated from the more 
limited scientific interest in what happens and how it happens. This is not to suggest 
that questions of cause and effect have simply disappeared, but they have been 
transformed within Galileo’s apparatus.  
The instantaneous velocity of a falling body is defined as the “effect” of its past, judged 
from a determinate point of view: tell me what height you have fallen from. And it is also 
the “cause” of a future, judged from an equally determinate point of view: I’ll tell you how 
high you will able to climb.’ (Stengers, Cosmopolitics 104) 
 
In the case of a pendulum, the height it will achieve after its first swing is “caused” by 
its initial height. So, its second height is an “effect” of its past. Cause and effect, in 
this instance, are reciprocal. As a result, ‘not only does cause provide the true 
measure of effect, but the measurement is reversible’ (Stengers, Cosmopolitics 106). 
The use of scare quotes by Stengers should alert us to the fact that this is not the 
discovery of the “true” or metaphysical definition of “cause” and “effect”– it is a very 
specific case. What is remarkable is the success of Galileo’s apparatus in accounting 
for such causes and effects. His procedure has become the model of “good” science, 
in that it requires no more than itself to express its point. Even though it is a 
construction, a fabrication, a fiction even, it is not mere speculation, imagining or idle 
theorizing of an individual mind.  
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 The reading of Stengers’ account provided so far does not constitute a 
general theory of cause or causation. It is very specifically related to the velocity of 
falling bodies to what we now call mechanics (or dynamics) -  a subset of physics. 
Within this field, there is a reciprocity of cause and effect but there is no notion of 
compulsion or determinism in this relation. That particular body did not have to fall at 
that particular moment, and certainly not from any specific height. But once it does, 
its effect is guaranteed. 
 
A Question of Faith 
As has been seen, according to Whitehead, what science inherited from 
medievalism was ‘the inexpungable belief that every detailed occurrence can be 
correlated with its antecedents in a perfectly definite manner’ (Whitehead, Science 
15). In the medieval era, this belief was guaranteed by the rationality of a specific 
kind of God who supervised these occurrences and their regularities. Modern 
sciences laid emphasis on the regularities, the ability to correlate occurrences with 
antecedents in a rational manner. For this to be possible, there must be genuine 
regularity in the world. It is this regularity which would become called “the order of 
nature”. Nature is not capricious, it displays the same characteristics, under the 
same conditions, repeatedly, endlessly. ‘This remorseless inevitableness is what 
pervades scientific thought. The laws of physics are the decrees of fate’ (Whitehead, 
Science 13). The next step is to move from fate to faith. 
 Whitehead takes his notion of fate from certain aspects of Greek thought 
which the West inherited. It is a ‘vision of fate, remorseless and indifferent, urging a 
tragic incident to its inevitable issue, is the vision possessed by science. Fate in 
Greek Tragedy becomes the order of nature in modern thought’ (Whitehead, Science 
10); remembering that ‘the essence of tragedy is not unhappiness. It resides in the 
solemnity of the remorseless working of things’ (Whitehead, Science 13). Whitehead 
is careful not to overstate his case. He does not assert that individual scientists 
directly inherited this concept of fate (Whitehead, Science 14) and he is clear that he 
is ‘not talking of the explicit beliefs of a few individuals’ (Whitehead, Science 16). 
Instead, he is outlining a certain ‘tone of thought and not a mere creed of words’ 
(Whitehead, Science 16).  
This tone of thought, as just stated, did not come directly from the knowledge 
of Greek literature but passed through the specific theology of the medieval epoch. It 
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is here that theological element arose, or took on a new shape. The faith of modern 
science is that the world will remain the same, that there is an order to nature. This 
specific concept of an order of nature relies on the Greek conception of fate. In this 
sense: modern science has a faith in fate. ‘My explanation is that the faith in the 
possibility of science, generated antecedently to the development of modern 
scientific theory, is an unconscious derivative from medieval theology’ (Whitehead, 
Science 16). This faith in fate ‘is the motive power of research:- that there is a secret, 
a secret which can be unveiled’ (Whitehead, Science 15).  
 Whitehead’s account is a general one, it aims to sweep us up in its argument, 
to lead us to reconsider our understanding of science, to approach the problem in a 
new way. He asks us to consider the role of fate and faith in its origin and in its 
legacy, without giving up on its capacity to tell us more about the world. Stengers 
would not disagree with such an approach but she would, perhaps, add that we need 
to pay attention to the details, to what actually happened. Her reading of Galileo 
presents not only the details of Galileo’s construction, but a description of the 
construction of his faith; a faith that the world will do what is required of it, it will 
provide the consistent falling and acceleration of bodies. Without this faith he would 
not have been drawn to construct, redesign, refine his apparatus. One upshot of his 
faith is a re-placement of cause and effect. These are now distributed; they act as 
counter-balances. Moreover, cause and effect become located in a specifically 
constructed arena in the world and are divorced from questions of “why?”. Galileo’s 
concern is not why the bodies fall at regular rates; it is Leibniz and Newton who will 
take up this question. 
 What Galileo and Stengers give us is an utter refusal of the metaphysical 
concept of cause which predominated in the “inflexible rationality” of medievalism. 
Science and scientists may well be interested in causes, but not in “cause” as an 
abstract, metaphysical concept, which can be elaborated prior to a detailed 
investigation of the world. This may seem like a small point but it is an important one 
which is often overlooked by both science and philosophy.  
As a result, cause has a somewhat confused status. Stengers cites Russell to 
clarify one element of this argument: ‘All philosophers, of every school imagine that 
causality is one of the fundamental axioms or postulates of science, yet, oddly 
enough, in advanced sciences such as gravitational astronomy, the word “cause” 
never occurs’ (Russell cited in Stengers, Cosmopolitics 122). This is because, 
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following Galileo, science became interested in mapping the details of interrelations, 
such as those between gas molecules in a pressurized container, between planets 
orbiting a distant sun. Such investigations preclude (or should preclude) any 
conception of a cause beyond the instances which can be found in these 
interrelations. Likewise, social science has moved beyond direct causes and has 
placed its faith in correlations between variables which, apparently like those of 
science, can be treated as independents (age, gender, ethnicity, class, etc.). I will 
return to a discussion of social science in terms of cause, correlation and faith 
toward the end of this piece. 
 Nevertheless, the problems of philosophy are different to those of science or 
social science. Just because science has, for good reason, rejected metaphysical 
conceptions of cause this does not mean that a metaphysical conception of cause is 
not required within philosophy. We live in a world in which we experience causes 
(matches causing fires, cars causing crashes). What are we to make to these? Are 
they only illusions, human fabrications designed to make sense of the otherwise 
remorseless, meaningless, unfolding regularities in which scientists have placed their 
faith? To respond to such questions, the following section will address Whitehead’s 
philosophical rendering of cause. The discussion should not be taken simply as the 
solution to the problem of cause. My aim is, rather, to recast the problem. A crucial 
element of Whitehead’s account is that much of the muddle over the concept of 
cause comes from a misrecognition of its very status. Although he makes his point in 
an understated, almost quiet manner, Whitehead is asking us to radically rethink how 
we have inherited a one-sided, incomplete concept of cause. 
 
From Causation to Conformation: On Causal Efficacy 
 
Some of our experiences of the world involve experiences of things 
happening, and of some these happenings produce change. Whitehead maintains 
that philosophers have all too readily subsumed all such experiences under a 
specific and pre-formed concept of cause. It is this specific concept that Whitehead 
wants to challenge, not the concept of causation itself. For Whitehead, causation is 
not mysterious: ‘The notion of causation arose because mankind [sic] lives amid 
experiences in the mode of causal efficacy’ (Whitehead, Process 175). “Causal 
efficacy” signals one aspect of Whitehead’s reformed approach to cause. The use of 
10 
 
the term “efficacy” shows that he wants to retain what the concept of “efficient 
causation” was hinting at, without being constrained by it.   
Whitehead balances this notion of “causal efficacy” by introducing another 
term, that of “presentational immediacy” which, as its name suggests, is concerned 
with what is immediately present. Other philosophers might refer to this in terms of 
the sense-data of our immediate experience: the colours, sounds, lights, smells, 
roughness which make the world, and our experience of it, so vivid. ‘We open our 
eyes and our other sense-organs; we then survey the contemporary world decorated 
with sights, and sounds’ (Whitehead, Process 174). The nub of Whitehead’s 
argument is that, when thinking about cause, philosophers have focused on 
presentational immediacy and have ignored the importance of causal efficacy. In his 
understated way, Whitehead is making the bold claim that philosophy has missed 
the point with regard to causation by considering only half the problem. ‘Philosophers 
have disdained the information about the universe obtained through their visceral 
feelings, and have concentrated on visual feelings’ (Whitehead, Process 121). As 
Meyer puts it, ‘philosophy has only considered the “visual” at the expense of the 
“visceral”’ (Meyer, “Introduction” 19). The problem arises when the visual, when 
presentational immediacy, is taken as the only mode by which we gain information 
about the world as it reduces the problem of cause to the realm of sense-perception.  
This has both exaggerated and mispresented the issue. According to 
Whitehead, philosophers and scientists who have followed Hume and engaged in 
debates over whether we “see” causes in the world have missed the point. We will 
never solve the problem of cause by trying to impute or infer causes which 
supposedly lie behind what we can see or observe, be it in everyday life, beyond the 
regularities we observe, or lying behind the data that we have generated. 
Whitehead’s response to Hume’s claim that causes are not disclosed in sense-
perception, that they are “unknown”, borders on the jocular: 
 
If Hume had stopped to investigate the alternative causes for the occurrence of visual 
sensations - for example, eye-sight, or excessive consumption of alcohol - he might have 
hesitated in his profession of ignorance. If the causes be indeed unknown, it is absurd to 
bother about eye-sight and intoxication. The reason for the existence of oculists and 
prohibitionists is that various causes are known. (Whitehead, Process 171). 
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Causes are known. We live in a world in which cars crash into each other, and we 
attribute blame (and financial reparation) by establishing who or what caused the 
accident. Human activity is causing global warming. Drinking alcohol makes you 
drunk (it causes changes in the nervous system, etc.). It is the abstract, prior, 
metaphysical concept of cause is that is problematic. This is why science rejected it. 
However, modern science has found it difficult to “replace” this concept of cause, as 
to do so with any a priori concept of cause would be to return to the metaphysics, the 
“inflexible rationality” whose rejection was a cornerstone of the birth of modern 
science (as has been seen in Whitehead’s general account and Stengers’ specific 
analysis of Galileo). Whitehead invokes “causal efficacy” as one way of developing a 
philosophical account of cause which is not tainted by the inflexible rationality of 
medieval metaphysics. But, what exactly is “causal efficacy”?  
 Causal efficacy provides information about location, and the relation of a body 
to the rest of the world. Our body is a specific locale which endures and relates to 
other items in the world. Causal efficacy involves the sense of the move from the 
past to the present. This is why it is tied up with causation. If causation really were 
situated only within the realm of presentational immediacy, then we might see 
apparent superficial changes of colour, shape, sound or taste. But this information, 
and our experience of the world, would be very limited. We would know little about 
where these and would lack any sense of continuity, location, the past, present and 
future. We would be stuck in an ever-shifting present with no clue as to why things 
were changing. It is only because there is the heavy, slower, enduring realm of 
transmission of feeling which constitutes causal efficacy that we can ever experience 
or talk of one event following, producing or causing another. For example, we may 
see a bright patch of red moving quickly and getting louder. We only know to jump 
out of the way of the approaching red car because our body residing in the realm of 
causal efficacy, provides a context for this data, and the ability to get out of the way.  
The concept of causal efficacy enables Whitehead to state that: ‘We are in the 
world and the world is in us’ (Modes 227); and to talk ‘of our general sense of 
existence, as one item among others, in an efficacious actual world’  (Whitehead, 
Process 178)’. Importantly: ‘Causal efficacy is the hand of the settled past in the 
formation of the present’ (Whitehead, Symbolism 50).This mention of the past and its 
relation to the present is important. For, when Whitehead is talking of causation, he 
is also talking of how it is possible to move from one state of affairs to another. If 
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there were a disjunction or separation between these, there would be no possibility 
of a spatial or temporal passage from the past to the present. Thus, for Whitehead, 
causation must always be considered in terms of what he terms “conformation”.  
When something occurs it arises from something which precedes it. 
Whitehead takes this a step further and states that it must also recognize that which 
comes before. This is one role of “causal efficacy”: ‘Thus the causal efficacy from the 
past is at least one factor giving our presentational immediacy in the present. The 
how of our present experience must conform to the what of the past in us’ 
(Whitehead, Symbolism 58). One fact, event or occasion does not simply follow from 
or produce another. “Facts” are not neutral, even though they constitute what has 
happened, as they always occur in a certain way, they always contain a “how” – they 
happen quickly or slowly, for example. Such a “how” is not purely abstract, it is 
integral to the happening and to what can follow. This “how” does not constitute a 
metaphysical “why”. The relation of the “how” of the past to the present is what 
Whitehead calls “conformation”. The present must form itself with what has 
happened. Hence to con-form, to “form with”. ‘The past consists of the community of 
settled acts which, through their objectification in the present act, establish the 
conditions to which that act must conform’ (Whitehead, Symbolism 36).2 
As Stengers makes clear, in both her close reading of Whitehead (Thinking) 
and throughout her work, we need to pay more attention, to be more specific with 
what problem we are dealing with. ‘Whatever our many ways to access what we call 
reality, they are all passionate as they all imply learning how to pay due attention, 
and accessing metaphysical reality is no different’ (Stengers, Speculative 210).  
Metaphysics requires a metaphysical response. This applies to the concept of 
cause, and especially to that of final cause, to what draws us on, to that which is 
invoked by the very word “faith”. I have not, however, offered a purely metaphysical 
account or response. In one sense, it would have been “easy” for me to have offered 
Whitehead’s more metaphysical account of final causation in terms of the “subjective 
aim” which accompanies, indeed helps define, the specific coming to be of any 
actual entity (see, for example, Process 19). Such an argument might have been 
                                                          
2
 It should be noted that conformation and causal efficacy are only not concerned with the passage from the 
past to the present. They also involve the future. ‘The future is immanent in the present by reason of the fact 
that the present bears in its own essence the relationships which it will have to the future. It thereby includes 
in its own essence the necessities to which it must conform’ (Whitehead, Adventures 250).  
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technically “correct”, in that it would, hopefully, be an accurate rendition of what 
Whitehead “says”. It would not, however, have satisfied the requirements of the 
argument that I am trying to set out here, namely, that of the question of faith. 
Metaphysical questions are not sufficient in themselves to account for the role and 
status of cause in science, social science or the everyday world. A metaphysical 
concept, on its own, does not necessarily draw us on.  
 
Conclusion - Some thoughts on the Faith of the Social Sciences 
 
Stengers does not often engage with social science and its concerns. It is not a 
problem which interests her as much as other problems do. Her occasional 
comments are, however, insightful. For example, in her comparison of physics, 
social science (in this case, economics) and the problem of cause, Stengers 
comments on the apparent “disappearance” of cause and effect, as seemingly 
enabled by Lagrangian equations: 
 
This gave birth to the idea, so often advanced, that physics, the model of science, 
promulgates laws that ignore causality. The theoreticians of the social sciences, and 
economics in particular, who must constantly remind us that the correlations they 
establish cannot be compared to “causes” often use the example of rational mechanics 
to deny that, in doing so, they are giving up anything at all. (Stengers, Cosmopolitics 
121-2). 
 
The concerns of science and philosophy have been addressed throughout this piece. 
For the remainder, I will focus on social science. This is a notoriously difficult field to 
define, to analyse or speak for as a whole. However, I will use the phrase “social 
science” in the manner suggested by Savransky where he describes their 
commonality in terms of ‘a historically situated attitude’ (Relevance 15). This bears 
some similarities to Foucault’s argument (Order) that the social sciences are 
constituted by those specific techniques, ways of seeing, thinking and reading, that 
developed in the 18th and 19th century and which formed “man” as both the subject 
and object of possible knowledges.  
 As discussed previously, science has a specific relationship to the concept of 
cause, which arises from its direct rejection of elements of a specific medieval 
theological context from which it was born. In practice, many scientists may refer to 
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causes or causal mechanisms in an ad hoc way, but this arises from their faith in 
regularity, not their advocacy of an abstract, prior metaphysical concept of cause. 
The same cannot be said of social science which has its own tortuous history. 
Although some social scientists, such as those interested in “regression analysis” 
would want to invoke some notion of causation,3 they would recoil from the charge of 
advocating direct causation with its associated taint of determinism and teleology.  
The notion of direct causation, where one cause can be isolated and used 
both to explain and predict the present and future of society, has been abandoned 
(except by some diehards). This would be to resort to calling upon crude 
mechanisms beyond the wit of humans, which nevertheless explain the behaviour of 
such humans. This is, in fact, the heart of Latour’s critique of much sociology; that it 
indulges in a double-think, relying upon direct causal objects (such as class and 
gender) to shore up its explanations while both denying that it believes in such 
objects and disallowing others from so doing (see, for example, Latour, Matters). My 
point is not the same as that of Latour. The question which interests me is whether 
social scientists in rejecting cause have nevertheless, and like their natural science 
counterparts, retained a concept of faith. Science has faith in the order of nature. 
This faith was partly constituted by its rejection of a metaphysical concept of cause. 
Social science also rejected a metaphysical conception of cause, but in what did it 
place its faith? 
 It might appear that social has science has faith that things will change. As a 
creature of modernity, the specific attitude of social science is premised not on the 
remorseless unfolding of events, as is the case with the order of nature. Its attitude is 
predicated on the changing character of human groups, societies, institutions. Often 
this changeability is rendered in terms of the “historical” and this is, perhaps, one 
reason for the endurance of the triumvirate of Marx, Durkheim and Weber (in terms 
of, for example, “historical materialism”, the “historical development of ever more 
complex forms of the division of labour”, or the “historical spread of instrumental 
rationality”). It is, however, important not to reduce what might be termed 
“changeability” to some simplistic notion of the historical, historiography or 
historicism. It is more a matter of the very possibility of change, an attitude which can 
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 See, for example, (Morgan and Winship, Counterfactuals; Best and Wolf, Handbook; Rubin and Imbens, 
Inference) and even a paper titled “Do UN Interventions Cause Peace? Using Matching to Improve Causal 
Inference” (Gilligan and Sergenti “Interventions”).  
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be found at the heart of feminism and queer theory, and more. Is it possible to argue 
that changeability constitutes, or should constitute the faith of social science? 
Stengers would probable warn us that such a simple solution is both unlikely and 
dangerous. To put it bluntly, just because science has a faith in the order of nature 
does not mean that social science should seek to outline a faith which mirrors, yet 
differs from, the faith of science. This would be to repeat the labyrinthine arguments 
about the extent to which the natural sciences share an epistemology (or not), or 
have discrete ontological bases.  
 As Stengers makes clear throughout her work, the misrecognition of the origin 
of an abstraction is not only liable to vitiate its originality, it leads to an abuse of its 
power (Cosmopolitics 126-8). In the case of physics, this means that it claims more 
than it should for its field of inquiry. The ways that social science has traditionally 
treated the theories and models which it has developed to account for the changes 
supposedly witnessed in modernity have tended to become divorced from their 
original locations, and been redeployed across the “social field” without sufficient 
attention being paid to their specificity.4 In the case of social science it is liable to 
render its abstractions if not irrelevant, then less able to convince. For example, the 
following abstractions are famous, to social scientists are least: alienation, anomie, 
hegemony, strain theory, standpoint epistemology. All of these were hard won 
abstractions, developed in specific milieux to respond to different problems. Marx 
carved out alienation from the remnants of Hegel to outline the condition of workers 
in early capitalism; Durkheim sought to account for the ways in which solidarity could 
both be produced and fail in newly developed industrialized cities and societies; 
Merton described the “alternative” means chosen by “deviants” to fulfil the cultural 
goals of the novel phenomenon of a consumer society; feminists expanded 
traditional notions of epistemology by insisting on a recognition of the societal 
location of knowledge and the knower. However, it is the concept of hegemony 
which is the most telling for the argument that I am trying to make. 
 Gramsci conjured the concept of hegemony to portray the manner in which 
capitalism made concession to localized cultural and historical elements in order to 
consolidate and extend its reach throughout the cultural, societal, economic, political, 
religious aspects of society. Yet, this concept is itself, inherently “local”; a response 
                                                          
4
 I am grateful to Martin Savransky for pointing this out to me and his other helpful comments on the first draft 
of this article.  
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by Gramsci to the specificity of the economic, cultural and political field of early 20th 
century Italy. There is a danger that the terms “hegemony” and “hegemonic” become 
dislocated from their immediate locale, without due care and attention, and are 
applied, at will, to any situation without the requisite work being done. This flies in the 
face (and faith!) of the very radicality of the concept that Gramsci worked so hard to 
construct. Social science has put its faith in its abstractions without recognizing or 
admitting the details of their construction. It has been assumed that they are equally 
applicable, wherever “the social” can be found. 
 Stengers and Whitehead are clear that metaphysics has an important role, but 
the occasions on when its arguments are relevant must be recognized. Metaphysics 
involves adopting a specific standpoint,5 one which forgets the ‘peculiar problems of 
modern science’ so that we ‘put ourselves at the standpoint of a dispassionate 
consideration of the nature of things, antecedently to any special investigation into 
their details’ (Whitehead, Science 195). Taken in this sense, social science’s 
misplaced faith in its unchanging concepts which, paradoxically, are supposed to be 
able to render the very changeability of the world, have led it to become 
metaphysical. It has prioritized its concepts over the details of the world.  
 The position I have just sketched out is somewhat pessimistic – social science 
has again failed; it has misplaced its faith, and has misrecognized the status of its 
abstractions. Pessimism may well be a hallmark of much social science, with its 
tireless critique, but it is certainly not an accurate description of the work and 
approach of Stengers and Whitehead, whose work is laced with generosity and 
humour. With this in mind, I will finish with, if not an optimistic stance, then at least 
an openness to the future.  
 If social science is concerned with the changeable, it should be able to 
indicate something about such changes (without presupposing that it will uncover 
either the reason or the cause of such changes). It is here, perhaps, that Whitehead 
can change our approach. His challenge to traditional philosophical conceptions of 
causation argues that these have focused on presentational immediacy alone, and 
have missed out on “causal efficacy”. This leads to the question of how to approach 
questions of causal efficacy, and Whitehead’s response involves what he calls 
                                                          
5
 Melanie Seghal has discussed this more fully in her chapter ‘A Situated Metaphysics: Things, History, and 
Pragmatic Speculation in A.N. Whitehead’. 
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“conformation”. Could it be that social science has over-emphasized changeability at 
the expense of a recognition not of conformity but “conformation”? 
 
It might be possible to retain and cultivate the sense that social science 
believes that things will change, that both us and the world will be different. Could we 
somehow use this tentative belief to cultivate faith? Not “a” faith in the singular, as if 
there were one identifiable “thing” which could draw us all forward. Rather, just the 
idea of “faith” as something that is possible. As Stengers puts it: ‘faith is what is 
required against the “all is vanity” opium of scepticism, but it should be underlined 
that it does not offer any of the assurances that would silence the sceptic’ (Stengers, 
William 16). Rather than reject a metaphysical concept of cause (rightly) simply to 
replace it with a horror of any direct cause, but a tepid faith in the power of 
correlation or even the quasi relativism induced by seemingly ever-present sceptics, 
could social scientists not take something from Whitehead’s ideas of causation in 
terms of causal efficacy and conformation?  
By paying attention to modes of conformation, social science could admit an 
interrelation of how something changes with what actually changes. Causation will 
be involved, but not in the limited and limiting terms of “efficient causation”. By 
paying more attention, social science might come to realise that sometimes causes 
matter and sometimes they do not. Moreover, a recognition that the future imbues 
the present, in that the present articulates what is possible and it itself articulated by 
the possibilities that it sketches out, would enable a realization that we are all being 
drawn forward without falling back into an over-arching teleology, where we already 
know where we are going. By ignoring “conformation”, social science has developed 
a peculiarly unhistorical history; by recognizing the interrelations of conformation and 
causation, it might be possible develop a sense of faith in the future, balanced by a 
recognition of the role of causation in the present.  
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